The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are federal systems in which the responsibility for environmental policy-making is divided or shared between the central government and the (member) states. The attribution of decision-making power has important policy implications. This chapter compares the role of central and local authorities in the US and the EU in formulating environmental regulations in three areas: automotive emissions for health related (criteria) pollutants, packaging waste, and global climate change. Automotive emissions are relatively centralised in both political systems. In the cases of packaging waste and global climate change, regulatory policy-making is shared in the EU, but is primarily the responsibility of local governments in the US. Thus, in some important areas, regulatory policy-making is more centralised in the EU. The most important role local governments play in the regulatory process is to help diffuse stringent local standards through more centralised regulations, a dynamic which has become recently become more important in the EU than in the US.
INTRODUCTION
In the EU and the US, responsibility for the making of environmental policy is divided between EU and federal institutions, on the one hand, and local institutions, on the other. The former is comprised of the EU and the US federal government, while the latter consist of state and local governments in the US, and member states and subnational authorities in the EU.
1 Historically, environmental rules and regulations were primarily made at the state or local level on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the emergence of the contemporary environmental movement during the late 1960s and early 1970s led to greater centralisation of environmental policy-making in both the US and Europe.
In the US, this change occurred relatively rapidly. By the mid 1970s, federal standards had been established for virtually all forms of air and water pollution. By the end of the decade, federal regulations governed the protection of endangered species, drinking water quality, pesticide approval, the disposal of hazardous wastes, surface mining, and forest management, among other policy areas.
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For ease of presentation, we refer at times to both of the former as central authorities and both of the latter as states.
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The federalisation of US environmental policy was strongly supported by pressure from environmental activists, who believed that federal regulation was more likely to be effective than regulation at the state level.
In Europe, this change occurred more gradually, largely because the Treaty of Rome contained no provision providing for environmental regulation by the European Community (EC). Nonetheless, more than 70 environmental directives were adopted between 1973 and 1983 . Following the enactment of the Single European Act in 1987, which provided a clear legal basis for EC environmental policy and eased the procedures for the approval of Community environmental directives, EC environmental policy-making accelerated. Originally primarily motivated by the need to prevent divergent national standards from undermining the single market, it became an increasingly important focus of EC/EU policy in its own right. Each successive treaty has strengthened the EU's commitment to and responsibility for improving environmental quality and promoting sustainable development throughout Europe. Thus, notwithstanding their different constitutional systems, in both the EU and the US, the locus of environmental policy-making has become increasingly centralised over the last three decades.
Nevertheless, state governments continue to play a critical role in environmental regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. Most importantly, states remain an important locus of policy innovation and agenda setting. In many cases, new areas of environmental policy are first addressed at the state level and subsequently adopted by the central authority. Many state regulations remain more stringent or comprehensive than those of the central authority; in some policy areas, states retain primary responsibility. In other cases, responsibility for environmental policy-making is shared by both levels of government. Not surprisingly, in both federal systems, there are ongoing disputes about the relative competence of central and state authorities to regulate various dimensions of environmental policy.
We explore the dynamics of federal environmental policy-making in both the US and the states maintain regulations that are more stringent than those of other states? We focus on the development of US and EU regulatory policies in three areas: automobile emissions for criteria pollutants, packaging waste, and global climate change. Each policy area reflects a different stage in the evolution of environmental policy. These cases also demonstrate the differences and the similarities in the patterns of environmental policy-making in the US and the EU.
Automobile emissions typify the first generation of environmental regulation. A major source of air pollution, particularly in urban areas, automobiles were among the first targets of environmental regulation during the 1960s and 1970s and they remain an important component of environmental policy in every industrialized country. Packaging typifies the next generation of environmental regulation. Its emergence on the policy agenda during the 1980s reflected the increased public concern about the scarcity of landfills and the need to conserve natural resources. Unlike automobile regulation, which primarily affects only two industries, albeit critical ones (automotive manufacturers and the refiners of gasoline), packaging waste regulations affect virtually all manufacturers of consumer goods. The increased priority of reducing packaging waste and promoting re-use and recycling symbolises a shift in the focus of environmental regulation from reducing pollution to promoting eco-efficiency.
Global climate change represents a more recent dimension of environmental policy. It first surfaced during the mid-1980s, but it has become much more salient over the last decade. This policy area exemplifies the increasingly important international dimension of environmental regulation: global climate change both affects and is affected by the regulatory policies of virtually all countries. It also illustrates the growing economic scope of environmental regulation: few economic activities are likely to be unaffected by policies aimed at reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.
These three policy areas provide a useful window on the changing dynamics of the relationship between state and central regulation in the US and the EU. Since the mid-1980s, automobile emissions standards have been more centralised in the EU than in the US. The US permits states to 4 adopt more stringent standards, while the EU does not. However, both the EU and the US have progressively strengthened their regulations governing automotive emissions and fuel composition, though US federal emission standards remain more stringent than EU ones, with the exception of lead in gasoline (petrol) which has now been phased out on both sides of the Atlantic. For its part, California, which is permitted its own emissions standards, has become a world leader in the effort to encourage the development and marketing of low-and zero-emission vehicles.
The dynamics of the regulation of packaging waste differs considerably. In the US, the federal government plays little or no role in setting standards for packaging waste: packaging, recycling, and waste disposal are primarily the responsibility of state or local governments. However, the lack of federal standards has neither prevented nor discouraged many state governments from adopting their own regulations. There has been considerable innovation at the state level: a number of local governments have developed ambitious programmes to reduce packaging waste and promote recycling. There has been little pressure for federal standards and the federal government has not attempted to limit state regulations with one important exception: federal courts have repeatedly found state restrictions on 'imports' of garbage to violate the interstate commerce clause of the US constitution.
In the EU, the situation is more complex. Member states began to regulate packaging waste during the 1980s, while the EU became formally involved in this policy area in 1994. However, in contrast to automotive emissions, the responsibility for packaging regulation remains shared between central and state authorities. 
AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS United States
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The six common air pollutants are particulate matter, ground-level ozone, 3 carbon monoxide, oxides of sulphur (mainly sulphur dioxide), oxides of nitrogen (mainly nitrogen dioxide), and lead. 4 In US EPA parlance, these are also known as "criteria pollutants," since their permissible levels are established using two sets of criteria, developed according to scientific guidelines. 5 Mobile sources, which include automobiles, are significant contributors to ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter pollution in many US cities, and also cause carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions.
Historically, motor vehicles were also the largest source of airborne lead emissions, but the removal lead from gasoline has dramatically reduced lead emissions from transport. Of the six criteria pollutants, only sulphur dioxide emissions, which are largely the result of fossil fuel combustion by power plants, are not substantially attributable to motor vehicles. In countries where the use of low-sulphur diesel fuels have not become widespread, yet diesel vehicle use is common, motor vehicles could be a source of sulphur-dioxide emissions. Some fuels used in marine or rail transport also contain high amounts of sulphur.
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would preempt all state emission regulations. However, an exception was made for California, provided that the state afforded adequate lead time to permit development of the necessary technology, given the cost of compliance within that time. 12 The exemption was granted 'in recognition of the acute automobile pollution problems in California and the political power of the Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985: 114. 14 Chanin, 2003: 699. 15 Percival et al., 1992. 16 Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985. 17 Congress based its 90 per cent reduction on 'the simple notion that since air pollution levels in major cities were approximately five times the expected levels of the NAAQSs, emissions would need to be reduced by at least 80 per cent, with an additional 10 per cent necessary to provide for growing vehicle use' (Percival et al., 1992: 834 Bryner, 1993: 150. 20 Chanin, 2003; Revesz, 2001 . 21 Revesz, 2001: 586. 22 This group included the Clean Air Trust and the Environmental Defense Fund, the STAPPA/ALAPCO (State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators / Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials), a nationwide organisation of state and local pollution control officials, and American Lung Association. In fact, the automakers were also in favour of the proposal to reduce sulphur content of gasoline, without which it would have been difficult to deliver the companion Tier 2 emission reductions. 23 All vehicles up to 8,500 pounds GVWR (gross vehicle weight rating) are subject to Tier 2 standards. Also, these standards are the same whether a vehicle uses gasoline, diesel or any other fuel; in other words, they are "fuel neutral. Parker, 2003. 34 Yost, 2002 . 35 California Air Resources Board, 2003 
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state over the next decade. 37 However, in the summer of 2003, both automobile firms dropped their suits against California after its regulatory authorities agreed to expand their credit system for hybrids to encompass a broader range of vehicles.
38
European Union
As in the US, in Europe, the regulations of state governments have been an important driver for centralised automotive emissions standards, with Germany typically playing the role in Europe that
California has played in the US. The EU has progressively strengthened its automotive emissions standards, both to improve environmental quality and to maintain a single market for vehicles.
However, European standards were strengthened at a much slower rate than were those in the US, and they were harmonised much later. Thus, in 1989, the EU imposed standards to be implemented in 
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(UK) also enacted restrictions on lead in gasoline in 1978, though less severe than Germany (0.45 grams per litre). With no restrictions imposed by any other member state, the resulting disparity in national rules and regulations represented an obstacle to the free movement of both fuel and motor vehicles within the EC. For not only did these divergent national product regulations limit intra-EC trade in gasoline, but since different car engines were designed to run on fuels containing different amounts of lead, they created a barrier to intra-Community trade in motor vehicles themselves.
Accordingly, the EC introduced a directive in 1978 that imposed a minimum and a maximum limit for lead content in gasoline (0.15 and 0.40 grams per litre, respectively), with both standards to go into effect in 1981. While the minimum requirement effectively allowed member states like Germany to establish the strict national limit they sought, it also prevented any member state from requiring lead-free gasoline and potentially disrupting the single market. In 1985, as a result of continued pressure from both Germany and Britain, the European Council required unleaded gasoline to be available in all member states by October 1989. The maximum lead content in gasoline was also further reduced to 0.15 gram per litre, and member states were encouraged to comply as quickly as possible. Two years later, member states were allowed to ban leaded gasoline, should they chose to.
In 1998, all Western European and several central European countries agreed to end the sale of leaded gasoline by 2005.
Unlike the lead standard, in the establishment of which the German regulations played an important role, the EC's standards for sulphur in fuel did not reflect the policy preferences of any member state.
The sulphur standard adopted in 1975 required all countries, including France, Germany, and the UK, to reduce their sulphur emissions. 39 France, for instance, had already adopted standards for sulphur in diesel fuel in 1966, but the more stringent levels in the European-wide standard forced the French standards lower as well. Germany's standard was adopted at the same time and was similar to that of the EC.
The auto emissions standards adopted in the EC during the 1970s were not mandatory. In fact, until 39 Bennett, 1991. 13 1987, member states were permitted to have standards less stringent than the European-wide standards, although they could not refuse to register or sell a vehicle on their territory if it met EC maximum standards. In effect, these early standards were maximum or ceiling requirements that were not developed not by the EC but instead were based heavily on emissions standards of the United Nations Economic Council for Europe.
In 1985 
PACKAGING WASTE United States
The regulation of packaging wastes is highly decentralised in the US. Thorman et al., 1996. 54 All rigid plastic container manufacturers have been in compliance with the law since it entered into force a decade ago, because the aggregate recycling rate for rigid plastic containers has remained between 27-30 per cent since the law took effect (Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, 2003). 55 Thorman et al., 1996. 17 minimum levels of recycled content in their products or to achieve minimum recycling rates.
Manufacturers of plastic trash bags are required to include minimum percentages of recycled plastic post-consumer material in trash bags they sell in California. California's 1991 Rigid Plastic Packaging Container (RPPC) Act sought to reduce the amount of plastic being landfilled by requiring that containers offered for sale in the state meet criteria akin to those laid down in the Oregon law. These criteria 'were designed to encourage reuse and recycling of RPPCs, the use of more post-consumer resin in RPPCs and a reduction in the amount of virgin resin employed RPPCs'. The result of the ECJ's ruling was to give a green light to other national recycling initiatives. Irish authorities proceeded with a ban on non-refillable containers for beer and soft drinks, while a number of Southern member states promptly restricted the sale of beverages in plastic bottles in order to 64 Vogel, 1995: 87. 20 protect the environment, and, not coincidently, domestic glass producers. The Netherlands, Denmark, France, and Italy promptly introduced their own comprehensive recycling plans. The most farreaching initiative to reduce recycling waste, however, was undertaken by Germany.
The 1991 German packaging law was a bold move towards a 'closed loop' economy in which products are reused instead of thrown away. It established very high mandatory targets, requiring that 90 per cent of all glass and metals, as well as 80 per cent of paper, board, and plastics be recycled. In addition, only 28 per cent of beer and soft drinks could be sold in disposable containers. The law also established 'take-back' requirements on manufacturers, making them responsible for the ultimate disposal of the packaging in which their products were sold and shipped. A quasi-public system was established to collect and recycle packaging, with the costs shared by participating firms. In addition to making it more difficult for foreign producers to sell their products in Germany, the so-called
Töpfer Law distorted the single market in another way. The plan's unexpected success in collecting packaging material strained the capacity of Germany's recycling system, thus forcing Germany to 'dump' its excess recycled materials throughout the rest of Europe. This had the effect of driving down prices for recycled materials in Europe, and led to the improper disposal of waste in landfills in other countries. 65 Yet, the ECJ's decision in the Danish Bottle Case, combined with its fear of being labelled 'anti-green', made it difficult for the Commission to file a legal challenge to the German regulation.
Accordingly, the promulgation of waste management policy now moved to the EU level. In 1994, following nearly three years of intense negotiations, a Directive on Packaging Waste was adopted by a qualified majority of member states with opposition from Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium. It required member states to recover at least half of their packaging waste and recycle at least one-quarter of it, within five years. Ireland, Greece, and Portugal were given slightly lower targets. More controversially, the Directive also established maximum standards: nations wishing to recycle more than 65 per cent of their packing waste could do so, but only if they had the facilities to 65 In 2001, Germany adopted a policy requiring deposits on non-refillable (one-way) glass and plastic bottles and metal cans in order to encourage the use of refillable containers. This law, which went into effect in 2003, aroused considerable opposition from the German drinks industry, which held it responsible for a dramatic decline in sales of beer and soft drinks and the loss of thousands of jobs. In addition, the European Commission, acting in response to complaints from non-German beverage producers, questioned the legality of the German scheme. The Commission agreed that the refusal of major German retailers to sell one-way drink containers had disproportionately affected bottlers of imported drinks, a position which was also voiced by France, Italy, and Austria. However, after the German government promised to revise its plan in order to make it compliant with EU law, the Commission decided not to take legal action.
As occurred during the previous decade, the extent to which new packaging waste initiatives by member states threaten or are perceived to threaten the single market has put pressure on the EU to 66 Haverland, 1999. 67 
CLIMATE CHANGE United States
In the US, greenhouse gas emissions remain largely unregulated by the federal government. In the 1990s, the Clinton Administration participated in the United Nations' effort to establish a treaty governing greenhouse gas emissions. While the US signed the Kyoto Protocol, no US President has submitted it to the Senate for ratification. RGGI, 2009a. 83 The initial regional emissions cap is set at 188 million short tons of carbon dioxide per year. This amount is about 4 per cent above annual average regional emissions measured during (RGGI, 2007 . 84 RGGI, 2009b. 85 RGGI, 2009c. 25 development. This program targets the western states and provinces of the US and Canada. 86 The goal of WCI is a 15 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels by 2020. Similar to the RGGI, the WCI will be a cap-and-trade program and have three-year compliance periods. But unlike the RGGI, it will not be limited to carbon dioxide emissions or solely target the electric power sector. When fully implemented in 2015, the WCI is expected to cover nearly 90 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions in participating jurisdictions. Also, WCI members are required to auction off only a portion of total allowances (10 per cent at the outset, increasing to at least 25 per cent by 2020) and may choose to allocate the remainder to participating installations free of charge. In addition to these three multi-state initiatives, several states have been pursuing indirect means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 91 For example, more than half the US states have enacted legislation that requires utilities to provide a certain percentage of electricity generated from During the Bush Administration, the marked divergence between state and federal policies in this area led to a flurry of lawsuits. Two of these are worth noting. The first was brought by automotive manufacturers against the state of California. Stating its intention to challenge California's GHG standard in federal court, the president of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers argued that 92 As of January 2010, 29 states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws imposing these "renewable portfolio standards" (Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, 2010). 93 As of September 2009, the following states had already developed, or were in the process of developing, mandatory greenhouse gas reporting rules: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (US EPA, 2009a). 94 The states are Alaska, New Jersey, New York, California, Maryland, and all six New England states (Sterngold, 2002 
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The waiver decision has signalled a warming of relations between states and the federal government on the issue of climate change. In return for granting the waiver, the federal government secured the commitment of California, 105 along with of a broad set of stakeholders including auto manufacturers, to adopt uniform federal vehicle fuel economy standards (known as CAFE, short for Corporate Average Fuel Economy, standards) and to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from transport, whose implementation the Obama Administration accelerated by executive order.
An update to the CAFE standards-the first such proposal in several decades-was passed as part 
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undergoing modifications, to obtain operating permits from the agency. The rule would cover facilities with more than 25,000 tons of greenhouse gas emissions per year and the permits would be issued based on a facility's ability to utilize best practices to control such emissions. 109 This proposal has so far been interpreted as a strategic move by the Obama Administration to compel the Congress to pass more comprehensive legislation dealing with climate change.
As of early 2010, the draft National Program rulemaking was in the process of becoming finalized.
But it remained unclear whether the EPA would pursue the draft rulemaking on the permitting of large emitters, or defer to the Congress.
Thus, in contrast to developments in the area of packaging waste, the lack of federal regulations for greenhouse gas emissions has become a political issue in the US. Clearly, the issue of climate change is much more politically salient in the US than is the issue of packaging waste. Thus, proposals to address the former but not the latter frequently come before Congress. Finally, while packaging waste can be seen as a problem which can be effectively addressed at the local or state level, global climate change clearly cannot. Even the regulatory efforts of the most ambitious states will have little impact on global climate change in the absence of federal regulations that impose limits on carbon dioxide emissions throughout the US.
European Union
By contrast, both the EU and individual EU member states have been active in developing policies to mitigate climate change. In the early 1990s, several countries (including Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany) had adopted or were about to adopt taxes on either carbon dioxide specifically or energy more generally. Concerned that such taxes would undermine the single market, Collier, 1996 . 112 Environment Daily, 1997 Smith and Chaumeil, 2002. 31 asked to keep the number of allowances low and in line with their Kyoto commitment. The EU ETS is gradually being extended to include additional economic sectors. For example, emissions from international aviation will be subject to the EU ETS starting January 1, 2012. 
ANALYSIS
The dynamics of the relationship between central and state authorities varies considerably across these six case studies. In three cases (automobile emissions in the EU and the US, and packaging waste policies in the EU), state governments have been an important source of policy innovation and diffusion. In these cases, state authorities were the first to regulate, and their regulations resulted in 121 Renewable energy certificates represents a similar concept to tradable white certificates and emissions allowances. In case of renewable energy certificates, energy generated from approved renewable energy resources is certified and traded in a secondary market, and can be applied as offsets towards reducing the greenhouse gas emission burden of an installation. 122 Mundaca and Neij, 2007 and Labanca and Perrels, 2008. 123 European 34 the adoption of more stringent regulatory standards by the central government. In the case of climate change policies, both EU and member state regulations have proceeded in tandem, with one reinforcing the other.
In the two remaining cases (packaging waste and climate change in the US), American states have been a source of policy innovation, but not of significant policy diffusion. To date, state initiatives in these policy areas have not prompted an expansion of federal regulation, though some state regulations have diffused to other states. The earlier US pattern of automotive emissions standards, in which California and other states helped ratchet up federal standards, has so far not applied to either of these policy areas. However, over the years, the issue of climate change has become more politically significant than packaging waste, and the extended pressure by the states may generate some form federal action on climate under the Obama Administration. Moreover, as climate change gains prominence as the broader environmental threat, automotive emissions are increasingly evaluated in the same context. As a result, this potential federal action on climate change may be twopronged. As of early 2010, even stricter automobile fuel economy and emissions standards-proposed to be on par with those of California-were already on the drawing board. In fact, the associated draft rulemaking, which sets national standards for vehicle greenhouse gas emissions for the first time, was the result of an agreement between the federal government and California. This action on motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions may then be followed by legislative or regulatory action directed at other sources of greenhouse gas emissions.
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On the other hand, in Europe, relatively stringent state environmental standards continue to drive or parallel more closely the adoption of more stringent central standards. Thus, in the EU, the dynamics of the interaction between state and central authorities has become much more significant than in the US. Why has this occurred? Three factors are critical: two are structural and one is political. First, in the EU, states play a direct role in the policy-making process through their representation in the 124 Legislative action could consist of the Congress passing a climate change bill that might call for a nationwide cap-and-trade scheme in greenhouse gases. Regulatory action could involve the US EPA issuing a rulemaking to establish carbon dioxide regulation, as mentioned earlier. The agency could perhaps even establish a cap-and-trade market similar to the existing markets for nitrogen oxides and sulphur dioxide. The regulatory path has the potential to be more contentious than the legislative path. Stone, 1990. 36 that when faced with divergent state standards, particularly with respect to products, the EU is likely to find itself under more pressure than the US central government to prevent them from interfering with the single market. Accordingly, they must be either challenged or harmonised.
In principle, harmonisation need not result in more stringent standards. In fact, the EU's Packaging
Directive imposes both a ceiling and a floor. But for the most part, coalitions of the EU's greener member states have been successful in pressuring the EU to adopt directives that generally strengthen European environmental standards. The political influence of these states has been further strengthened by the role of the European Commission, which has made an institutional and political commitment to improving European environmental quality; consequently, the Commission typically prefers to use its authority to force states to raise their standards rather than lower them. In addition, the increasingly influential role of the EP, in which green constituencies have been relatively strongly represented, has also contributed to strengthening EU environmental standards.
The third factor is a political one. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a strong political push in the US for federal environmental standards. According to environmentalists and their supporters, federal regulation was essential if the US was to make effective progress in improving environmental quality. And environmentalists were influential enough to secure the enactment of numerous federal standards, which were generally more stringent than those at the state level. Thus, the centre of gravity of US environmental regulation shifted to Washington. After the Republican Party's capture of both chambers of Congress in 1994, followed by the two-term Republican presidency starting in 2000, relatively few more-stringent environmental standards were adopted. During this period, the national political strength of environmentalists and their supporters diminished.
Nevertheless, environmentalists and their supporters continued to be relatively influential in a number of American states. In part, this outburst of state activity has been a response to their declining influence in Washington. By 2008, a major discontinuity had emerged between the environmental policies of many US states and those of the federal government. This has meant that, unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, more stringent state standards have had much less impact on the 37 strengthening federal standards. Indeed, in marked contrast to two decades ago, when the automobile emissions standards of California and other states led to the progressive strengthening of federal standards in this critical area of environmental policy, California's recent policy efforts to regulate automobiles as part of a broader effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were initially challenged by the federal government on the grounds that they violated federal fuel-economy standards, an area of regulatory policy in which the federal government has exclusive authority but which it did not strengthen for more than two decades. The Obama Administration has sought to reinvigorate the federal government's environmental policy role, most notably in the critical area of global climate change. It has also reduced some of the friction between states and the federal government in the critical area of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.
In the EU, the political dynamics of environmental regulation differ markedly. The 1990s witnessed both the increased political influence of pro-environmental constituencies within the EUby the end of that decade, green parties had entered the governments of five Western European nations -and a decline in the influence of green pressure groups in the US federal government.
During this period, a number of EU environmental policies became more centralised and stringent than those of the US. 126 Paradoxically, while the US federal government exercises far more extensive authority than the EU, in each of three cases we examined, EU environmental policy is now more centralised than that in the US.
CONCLUSION
The focal cases are summarised in Table 9 .1. We conclude with general observations about the dynamics of environmental policy in the federal systems of the US and the EU. On one hand, the continued efforts of states in the US and member states of the EU to strengthen a broad range of environmental regulations suggest that fears of a regulatory race to the bottom may be misplaced.
Clearly, concerns that strong regulations will make domestic producers vulnerable to competition 126 Vogel, 2003. 38 from producers in political jurisdictions with less stringent standards have not prevented many states on both sides of the Atlantic from enacting many relatively stringent and ambitious environmental standards. On the other hand, the impact of such state policies remains limited, in part because not all states choose to adopt or vigorously enforce relatively stringent standards. Thus, in the long run, there is no substitute for centralised standards; they represent the most important mechanism of policy diffusion. Accordingly, the most important role played by state standards is to prompt more stringent central ones. But unless this dynamic comes into play, the effectiveness of state environmental regulations will remain limited. In the areas of both global climate change and packaging waste, virtually all state regulations of the US are less stringent than those of the EU. It is not coincidental that the case we examined in which EU and US standards are the most comparable -and relatively stringent -is automobile emissions, in which the US central government plays a critical role. By contrast, the lack of central regulations for both packaging waste and climate change clearly reflects and reinforces the relative laxity of US regulations in these policy areas. The EU's more centralised policies in both areas reflect the greater vigour of its recent environmental efforts.
